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I.
JURISDICTION
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as
amended).
II
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties appear to be in agreement as to the Statement of Facts which
are generally comprised of the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties and
submitted to the trial court together with testimony where each side testified as to
their interpretation and understanding of the law and regulatory scheme.
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III.
RESPONSE TO AND CLARIFICATION OF ARGUMENTS
POINT NO. 1:
THE "CONSTRUCTION TRADES" DOES NOT INCLUDE AND IN FACT IS
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE DESIGN, MANUFACTURE, ASSEMBLY
OR CONSTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
Given the direction of Appellee's argument on "construction trades", it seems
imperative that a clear understanding be reached as to what the Legislature
intended by the use of the term. Unlike the term "personal property" which is not
defined in the pertinent statutes cited in the briefs of Appellant and Appellee, the
term "construction trades" is statutorily defined and contains what Appellant
believes to be a limitation intended by the Legislature for regulatory purposes. The
definition is limited by its exclusion of personal property. As set forth in Appellee's
brief it is found at Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102(5) (1953, as amended), and
states:
(5) "construction trade" means any trade or occupation
involving construction, alteration, remolding, repairing,
wreaking or demolition, addition to, or improvement of
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam, bridge,
structure, excavation or other project, development or
improvement to other than personal property, (emphasis
added.
Perhaps as significant is the absence of a more limited or restrictive definition
for "personal property" within this definitional section of the code. It is Appellant's
contention that if the Legislature intended to include modular construction within
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the regulatory scheme put forth by Appellee requiring that such manufacturers be
licensed as building contractors that a first and essential step would have been to
define or restrict the term "personal property" to mean something other than its
general and accepted meaning or to include those types of construction of personal
property within the regulatory scope of construction trades.
What is further remiss from Appellee's brief is a citation to any judicial
authority attempting to define the term "personal property" or "construction trades"
to include activities similar to Appellant within the regulatory control of the Division
of Professional licensing although Appellant does note that some administrative
rulings of the Division have attempted to do so.
POINT NO. 2:
APPELLEE MISCONSTRUES APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE
DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE.
Appellee seems to infer from its argument that the Appellant is attempting to
challenge the statutes in question. On the contrary, Appellant contends that these
statutes are clear and unambiguous and convey a plain meaning which is
inconsistent with the interpretation put forth by the Division of Professional
Licensing. The Appellant contends that a reasonable interpretation of the statutes
must include the plain meaning of "personal property" which meaning extends to
and includes forms of personal property other than those that could be
characterized as "Sears exceptions" or vehicles licensed with the Department of
Motor Vehicles. In short, the Appellant does not challenge the language of the
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various statutes as promulgated by the Legislature but the Division's restrictive and
somewhat tortured interpretation for regulation purposes.
POINT NO. 3:
APPELLEE FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE STATUTORY USE OF THE
TERM "PERSONAL PROPERTY" RENDERS THE STATUTES AMBIGUOUS OR LEADS
TO AN UNREASONABLY CONFUSED, INOPERABLE OR BLATANT
CONTRADICTION OF THEIR EXPRESS PURPOSE.
The Appellant and Appellee have set forth the well settled rules for statutory
construction in Utah which seek to interpret statutes by utilizing the plain meaning
of their words. See State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah App. 1992). See also
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Co., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).
As has been stated previously, the Utah Courts assume that; each term in a statute
is used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable. As noted in Appellee's brief, only if the
language of a statute is ambiguous do the Utah Courts resort to other modes of
construction. However, Appellee fails to demonstrate how the Legislature's use of
the term "personal property" renders the meaning of the statute ambiguous.
Appellee further contends that a corollary to the rule is that a statutory term should
be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is neither unreasonably
confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the
statute. Appellant agrees. However, Appellant contends that Appellee has failed to
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demonstrate how an interpretation of the statute utilizing the plain meaning of
''personal property7' renders this statute confusing, inoperable or in blatant
contradiction of its express purpose. To the contrary, the Appellant contends that
the statutory language as promulgated is clear, decisive and definitive in expressing
the Legislature's intent to regulate the construction trades through licensing and
exempt certain similar activities that include a person engaged in the sale or
merchandising of personal property that by its design or manufacture may be
attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a
person, firm or corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix or attach that
property. Appellant believes that it is important to point out that this exemption is
a qualified one. It requires that such personal property be installed, affixed, or
attached by one who is licensed. In the instant case, as set forth in the stipulated
facts, paragraph 3, attached to Appellee's Appendix 1, the "[Appellant] transports
and delivers the structure by "low-boy" and off loads it at the site. The Appellant
does not do the site work, e.g. excavation, foundation, utilities, etc., nor does the
Appellant actually install or attach the structure to the foundation. . . installation of
the unit becomes the responsibility of the owner or a licensed contractor." In other
words, the rationale set forth by the trial court in its Certificate of Probable Cause
and reiterated in Appellee's brief that the "exception would swallow the rule" is not
true. Since the statute requires that a licensed contractor be involved in the
installation or attachment of such property to land, the Appellant is nothing more
than a supplier of assembled materials to a contractor. The Appellant contends

Page 5 of 12

that the legislature had the foresight to see that requiring the licensing of a supplier
of materials to a contractor would constitute an unnecessary redundancy in the
regulatory scheme . Fabrication of quality materials and compliance with the
appropriate building codes, the concern that did remain was insightfully addressed
by the Legislature in Chapter 56 which was intended to regulate the manufactured
housing industry. It assures that such construction meets with uniform and/or
federal housing building requirements monitored through inspections. The
contractor and local building inspector require inspection certificates to insure that
the item of personal property meets with the appropriate building code
requirements. In the case of the Appellant, the product does not leave the yard
until all inspections have been made. See paragraph 4, of Stipulated Facts,
Appellees Brief, Appendix I.
The Appellant contends that the Legislature foresaw that a contractor would
be involved in the process at the time of attachment and therefore considered it
unnecessary to require the manufacturer of the unit to also be licensed as a
contractor under Chapter 56. Consequently, Appellant is not asserting that
Chapters 55 and 56 are mutually excluded as asserted by Appellee; rather,
Appellant asserts that the two chapters work in conjunction with each other to
insure that the one who installs or attaches personal property to real property is
licensed as a contractor and the materials received, whether assembled or
unassembled, meet with the requirements promulgated under the Uniform Building
Standards Act. Such interpretation is plain, clear, and operable for regulatory
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purposes and adequately protects the general public from the health and safety
issues associated with poor workmanship or poor quality materials.
Appellant contends that notwithstanding Appellee's assertion to the contrary,
there is no independent public policy consideration to require licensing of
contractors except to afford a reasonable expectation of good workmanship and
standard quality materials in the construction of a home. This is accomplished by
the present statutory framework that interprets the language consistently with its
plain meaning. It does not require the tortured interpretation put forth by Appellee
to accomplish the public policy consideration.
POINT NO. 4:
APPELLEE ONLY CONFUSES THE ISSUE BY ATTEMPTING TO DISTINGUISH
APPELLANT AS ONE WHO ACTUALLY CONSTRUCTS MODULAR HOMES.
The Appellee attempts to draw distinction by asserting that Appellant is not
only engaged in the sale or merchandising of modular homes but actually
constructs modular homes. Appellee concedes that he constructs modular homes.
He constructs modular homes just as a mobile home manufacturer or a
manufactured home manufacturer constructs homes. Like a manufactured or
mobile home, the Appellant's products are generally complete and unattached to
real property. Notwithstanding, this is all addressed in the regulatory scheme
provided through Chapter 56 which distinguishes between mobile homes,
manufactured homes and modular construction only for the purpose of determining
which building code requirements apply. In Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-3(12)
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(1953, as amended) the Appellants particular form of construction or assembly is
defined under the term "modular unit". Which requires that Appellant's product
conform to the uniform building codes and not the HUD building code.
Moreover, as previously stated, the definition of "construction trade" in
Chapter 55 expressly excludes construction of personal property. The attempt by
Appellee to disqualify Appellant by classifying the activity as "construction" as
opposed to "manufacturing, assembling, or designing" is a non sequitur that adds
nothing to the rational or logical interpretation of the Statue or the intended
regulatory scheme of the construction trades or building code requirements.
POINT NO. 5:
THE INTERPRETATION OFFERED BY APPELLEE OF "PERSONAL PROPERTY"
WOULD RESULT IN THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN A MANNER THAT
WOULD RENDER IT UNREASONABLY CONFUSING, INOPERABLE AND
IN BLATANT CONTRADICTION OF ITS EXPRESS PURPOSE.
While Appellant contends that the language of the Statute is plain and
consistent with its ordinary use and meaning, the interpretation offered by Appellee
is illogical, confusing, and inoperable and extends the regulatory authority of the
Division blatantly beyond its express purpose.

Appellee offers two (2) explanations

as to why the term "personal property" as set forth in Section 305(6), Chapter 55,
Title 58, Utah Code Annotated should be limited to exclude Appellant. On the one
hand, Appellee contends that the personal property exemption was intended to
cover only components such as Sears products which they refer to as part of the
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"Sears exception." These would be products such as refrigerators, washing
machines, garbage disposals, light fixtures, toilets, sinks, electrical wiring, outlet
plugs, circuit breakers, sewer pipes, taps, faucets, etc. Effectively, any item of
personal property that could be purchased at a Sears store (or Appellant assumes a
similar merchandise store) would qualify under the exemption. This of course limits
the statutory meaning of the term "personal property" to a decision to be made by
management of a Sears store. Since the Sears catalog has been known to change
from year to year, a definition based upon a "Sears exception", is always illusive of
clear understanding its in scope and meaning. What is even more confusing,
however, is that this rationale is inconsistent with Appellee's second argument of
limitation, that of licensing.
The second argument of Appellee is that Appellant should not be excluded
from licensing under the personal property exemption because he is not licensed
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. Appellee cites to Administrative Rule 15655a-102(a) which defines personal property to mean "factory built housing and
modular construction, as a structure which is titled by the Department of Motor
Vehicle, State of Utah, and taxed as personal property.#/1 While at the time the
Administrative Rule was enacted provision was made for the licensing of modular
construction through the Department of Motor Vehicles, a subsequent change in

1

Ifthere is a factual issue of nonpayment of personal property taxes by Appellant it was
not established at the hearing. Appellee presented no evidence and Appellant's testimony was
uncontroverted on cross examination that he paid personal property tax on his construction units
See Hearing Transcript, Volume II, page 146.
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the law exempted modular construction from licensing.2 See Utah Code Annotated
§ 41-la-504(4) (1953, as amended). Since the Administrative Rule was never
changed to correspond with the change in the law, the Division now argues that the
Rule has a meaning that is exactly the opposite of its previous intention and
application which now effectively excludes all modular construction by implying that
the same is not personal property. While this form of logic defies a general and
accepted understanding of the term, it does nothing to explain why Appellee now
believes it has the broadened regulatory authority to require that modular
construction in the State of Utah only be done by licensed contractors. There is no
express legislative regulatory authority or directive supporting such an
interpretation and the application of such regulatory scheme would effectively
exclude even what has been identified by Appellee as the "Sears exception". In
short, Appellee's interpretation of "personal property" does nothing to clarify the
meaning of the statutes but in fact renders the term ambiguous, confusing,
inoperable and blatantly contrary to their express purpose.
IV.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, and also for those

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-lc-504(4), became law in 1992. Prior thereto,
provision had been made for the licensing of modular construction as a motor vehicle. The new
law exempts modular construction from licensing. However, Administrative Rule 156-55a-102(8)
which refers also to modular construction was never changed or amended to reflect this statutory
change in the law and thus creates the implication that modular construction should now be
excluded from the definition of personal property.
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reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief, having replied to Appellees Brief, prays that
relief be granted in reversing the trial court's decision, or remanded ordering that
judgment be entered consistent with the plain meaning of the statute, together with
such other and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper.
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